At the present stage, it is becoming more and more important for large companies to maintain their own impeccable reputation. Western companies have been introducing and developing compliance systems for quite a long time, and now Russian companies are also concerned about the development of such systems. Compliance strengthens the company’s reputation, which gives it another competitive advantage in the market. The purpose of the article is to study trends and prospects for the development of compliance in Russia, the problems (...) of its implementation in Russian companies. The paper provides a theoretical analysis of the concept and essence of compliance in the activities of companies, the features and components of compliance systems. Compliance systems and the work of compliance services were studied on the example of 50 large companies that were surveyed in March 2020. It was determined that less than half of the companies have such services; the full independence of such services is not always fully ensured; the capabilities of these services to perform compliance functions are not fully used and the most popular area of compliance is anti-corruption compliance. Prospects for further research are related to the study of the development of compliance in Russia, including the introduction of advanced foreign experience in Russian companies. The applied value of the material lies in the systematisation of information on the trends in the development of compliance in Russia at the present stage. (shrink)

In the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature, the principle of voluntarism is predominant and implies that responsible business activities are discretionary and reach beyond the rule of law. This principle fails to explain that governments have a great interest in CSR and exercise influence on firms’ CSR activities. Therefore, we argue in favour of a contingency approach on voluntarism in CSR. To this end, we analyse the academic literature to demonstrate how governments are part of the CSR debate. We selected (...) 703 papers where the impact of governments is mentioned from five journals in our field (BEER, BEQ, BSE, BAS, JBE) in the period 1982–2011. We studied the titles and abstracts of these papers and provide an overview of: (i) the geographical orientation of the reviewed studies; (ii) the variety of government levels involved; and (iii) the various subjects where governments appear to be involved. In addition, an in‐depth reading of a subsample of 39 articles offers more details on the role of governments in the CSR literature. Hence, we offer a structured overview on the discussion of CSR and governments while stimulating a contingent understanding of the voluntarism concept in CSR. (shrink)

From 1901 till, at least, 1919, Russell persistently maintained that there are two kinds of logic, between which he sharply discriminated: mathematical logic and philosophical logic. In this paper, we discuss the concept of philosophical logic, as used by Russell. This was only a tentative program that Russell did not clarify in detail, so our task will be to make it explicit. We shall show that there are three (-and-a-half) kinds of Russellian philosophical logic: (i) “pure logic”; (ii) philosophical logic (...) investigating the logical forms of propositions; (iii) philosophical logic exploring the logical forms of facts: in epistemology; and in the external world. In particular, Russell’s program or philosophical logic of the facts of the external world remained less than sketchily outlined. We shall discuss it in some detail in the hope that it can start a new life. (shrink)

Shortly before G. E. Moore wrote down the formative for the early analytic philosophy lectures on Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1910–1911), he had become acquainted with two books which influenced his thought: (1) a book by Husserl's pupil August Messer and (2) a book by the Greifswald objectivist Dimitri Michaltschew. Central to Michaltschew's book was the concept of the given. In Part I, I argue that Moore elaborated his concept of sense-data in the wake of the Greifswald concept. Carnap (...) did the same when he wrote his Aufbau, the only difference being that he spoke not of sense-data but of Erlebnisse. This means, I argue, that both Moore's sense-data and Carnap'sErlebnisse have little to do with either British empiricists or the neo-Kantians. In Part II, I try to ascertain what made early analytic philosophy different from all those philosophical groups and movements that either exercised influence on it, or were closely related to it: phenomenologists, Greifswald objectivists, Brentanists. For this purpose, I identify the sine qua non practices of the early analytic philosophers: exactness; acceptance of the propositional turn; descriptivism; objectivism. If one of these practices was not explored by a given philosophical school or group, in all probability, it was not truly analytic. (shrink)

In 1930, at the initiative of Nikolay Raynov, was founded the Bulgarian Roerich Society. This brief essay, written and published by Raynov in the Newspaper Zarya 1933, aims to introduce the oeuvre of Nicholas Roerich and his ideas of Pax Cultura – peace trough culture – to a larger Bulgarian audience. Raynov argues that it is not enough to create oeuvres of art, i.e. to write books or to paint pictures, but that it is also necessary to fight for (...) the protection of cultural works and monuments, especially in times of conflict and war. In this sense, this brief essay can be conceived as a call to the Bulgarian public to join the Roerich Pact, elaborated in 1928/1929. (shrink)

Hermann Lotze was a key figure in the philosophy of the second half of the 19th century, influencing practically all leading philosophical schools of the late 19th and the early 20th century: (i) the neo-Kantians; (ii) Brentano and his school of descriptive psychology; (iii) the British idealists; (iv) Husserl’s phenomenology; (v) Dilthey’s philosophy of life; (vi) Frege’s new logic; (vii) the early Cambridge analytic philosophy; (viii) William James’s pragmatism. The book first presents the main ideas of Hermann Lotze’s philosophy (Part (...) I), and then traces his influence on the descriptive psychology of Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf (Part 2) and Cambridge analytic philosophy (Part 3). In addition, the book includes Bertrand Russell’s conspectus of J. E. McTaggart’s 1898 lectures on Lotze. (shrink)

Between 1896 and 1898 Russell’s philosophy was considerably influenced by Hermann Lotze. Lotze’s influence on Russell was especially pronounced in introducing metaphysical—anthropological, in particular—assumptions in Russell’s logic and ontology. Three steps in his work reflect this influence. (i) The first such step can be discerned in the Principle of Differentiation, which Russell accepted in the Essay (finished in October 1986); according to this Principle, the objects of human cognition are segmented complexes which have diverse parts (individuals). (ii) After Russell reread (...) Lotze in June 1897, he claimed that the solution of the dilemma of pluralism or monism depends on how we see space and time: as relational or as adjectival? (iii) Russell decided for the relational conception only after he attended lectures by McTaggart on Lotze in January to February 1898. The lectures helped Russell to advance (from April to June 1898) a new theory of judgment according to which judgments relate terms (individuals) which are distinct one from another. Space and time moreover are series of moments and places with external relations between themselves. The discussions Russell had with Moore in May to June 1898 took place only after Russell developed this conception; they did not cause his philosophical turn. (shrink)

Although influential in philosophy and relevant to international political theory’s (IPT) key concerns, Donald Davidson has not received commensurate attention in IPT. I aim here to commence filling this gap. I explore Davidson’s insights which fruitfully challenge established disciplinary views. The notions of rationality, objectivity and truth, and, on the other hand, those of intersubjectivity, language and interpretation are often needlessly separated and constricted by seemingly alternative approaches. Davidson firmly reconnects these notions. He helps rethink the realist, strong post-positivist, but (...) also liberal, ‘thin’ constructivist and critical (not thoroughly contextualist) approaches. He bridges the normative cosmopolitan–communitarian distinction. Eventually, Davidson laid foundations for a perspective foregrounding possibilities for rational communication and agreement between very different contexts and also for the non-dogmatic, pluralist and dynamic nature of communication itself. (shrink)

The purpose of the study is an institutional view of the state and modern Russia, as opposed to the civilizational and formational worldview. It allows you to switch public and scientific consciousness from a statocentric to a sociocentric worldview, in its own way reveals the correlation of the categories of people, society and the state in the political universe. As a result, the history of political society appears to be a socio-dialectical sequence of public legal structures built by historically changeable (...) political norms. The analysis of institutional transitions and political norms allows us to assert that modern society, including the Russian one, is rationally moving towards a libertarian institution, i.e. to co-governance of citizens equal in law. (shrink)

Philosophy is deeply rooted in human nature. On the one hand, thinking of an infinite essence of the universe may actualize an infinite essence of humans themselves and thus root them in the Cosmos infinity. On the other hand, to think of infinity is to acquire the power of infinity, i.e., an infinite power. In short, thinking in terms of infinity fills us with infinity. Philosophy allows individuals to overstep the limits of the lived experience, transcends their Selves beyond daily (...) occurrence. Obviously, just this human transcendence into metaphysical reality, into the world of essential relationships ensures a therapeutic effect of philosophy. (shrink)

Hermann Lotze was a key figure in the philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century, influencing practically all the leading philosophical schools of the late nineteenth and the coming twentieth century, including (i) the neo-Kantians; (ii) Brentano and his school; (iii) The British idealists; (iv) William James’s pragmatism; (v) Husserl’s phenomenology; (vi) Dilthey’s philosophy of life; (vii) Frege’s new logic; (viii) the early Cambridge analytic philosophy.

Aristotle first investigated different modes, or ways of being. Unfortunately, in the modern literature the discussion of this concept has been largely neglected. Only recently, the interest towards the concept of ways increased. Usually, it is explored in connection with the existence of universals and particulars. The approach we are going to follow in this chapter is different. It discusses Wittgenstein’s conception of higher ontological levels as ways of arranging elements of lower ontological levels. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein developed his (...) ontology of ways (Art und Weise) in six steps: (i) Constructing states of affairs out of objects; (ii) Constructing propositions out of states of affairs; (iii) Constructing propositional signs; (iv) Constructing thoughts with the help of propositional signs; (v) Constructing truth / falsity; (vi) Constructing works of art. In Philosophical Investigations he added further five ways of producing new ontological levels: (vii) the meaning of a proposition is the way in which it is verified; (viii) the child gets command on language/calculus in the way it replicates demonstrations of the teacher; (ix) the products of mind are ways of doing something; (x) an action is a way of carrying out the instructions for acting. (shrink)

The paper discusses a possibility of integral combination of various approaches for the adequate understanding of human being. In this regard, I analyze the feeling of love in the context of rational cognition and also suggest a secular interpretation of religious images and symbols that allow us to understand well-known heuristic and moral notions in a new light.

This book is a collection of the selected proceedings of the 4th International Conference "Human Being in Contemporary Philosophical Conceptions," which was held under the patronage of UNESCO at Volgograd State University (Russia) on May 28-31, 2007. In the letter to the organizers, Mr. Koïchiro Matsuura wrote: "I should like to congratulate you on this important initiative to promote philosophical reflection, which is one of the central objectives of UNESCO's Intersectoral Strategy on Philosophy." There is an interesting fact: the 19th (...) World Congress of Philosophy in Moscow (1993) had no session on philosophical anthropology, the next Congress in Boston (1998) had one such session, the 21st Congress of Philosophy in Istanbul (2003) had already four sessions, and the 22nd World Congress of Philosophy in Seoul (2008) had six sessions on philosophical anthropology. Obviously, we may observe a new anthropological renaissance in contemporary thought. This book serves the philosophical anthropology becoming as well. Perhaps an idea of integral studies is the most attractive trend in the contemporary philosophy and science. The book presents an experience in integral philosophy of human being. Also, the development of philosophical anthropology is closely connected with practical tasks. Our political activities, welfare projects and educational programs can become really useful only when we are guided by knowledge of what human being is, what we are able to do, what are own needs, and what we must become. Philosophical anthropology could correctly define the research purposes of all human sciences. This volume includes various reflexions and styles of thinking. By this, all the papers demonstrate metaphysics of respect for human being. The contributors, scholars from the different countries, are open for free discussions and fresh ideas. (shrink)

Russell’s initial project in philosophy (1898) was to make mathematics rigorous reducing it to logic. Before August 1900, however, Russell’s logic was nothing but mereology. First, his acquaintance with Peano’s ideas in August 1900 led him to discard the part-whole logic and accept a kind of intensional predicate logic instead. Among other things, the predicate logic helped Russell embrace a technique of treating the paradox of infinite numbers with the help of a singular concept, which he called ‘denoting phrase’. Unfortunately, (...) a new paradox emerged soon: that of classes. The main contention of this paper is that Russell’s new conception only transferred the paradox of infinity from the realm of infinite numbers to that of class-inclusion. Russell’s long-elaborated solution to his paradox developed between 1905 and 1908 was nothing but to set aside of some of the ideas he adopted with his turn of August 1900: (i) With the Theory of Descriptions, he reintroduced the complexes we are acquainted with in logic. In this way, he partly restored the pre-August 1900 mereology of complexes and simples. (ii) The elimination of classes, with the help of the ‘substitutional theory’, and of propositions, by means of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment, completed this process. (shrink)

Many historians of analytic philosophy consider the early philosophy of Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein as much more neo-Hegelian as once believed. At the same time, the authors who closely investigate Green, Bradley and Bosanquet find out that these have little in common with Hegel. The thesis advanced in this chapter is that what the British (ill-named) neo-Hegelians brought to the early analytic philosophers were, above all, some ideas of Lotze, not of Hegel. This is true regarding: (i) Lotze’s logical approach (...) to practically all philosophical problems; (ii) his treating of the concepts relation, structure (constructions) and order; (iii) the discussion of the concepts of states of affairs, multiple theory of judgment, general logical form; (iv) some common themes like panpsychism and contemplating the world sub specie aeternitatis. (shrink)

This text offers a discussion of the concept and experience of alienation, as it has been theorized in two very different traditions. Accordingly, I juxtapose a recent discussion by Italian Autonomist Marxist Franko “Bifo” Berardi to that of Argentine philosopher and scholar of indigenous cosmologies Rodolfo Kusch. Unlike Berardi’s anti-capitalist critique, Kusch identifies Western Modernity (and not just capitalism) as the source of alienation, and proposes a “de-linking” from its categories and epistemic practices. I caution that even a progressive meta-theory (...) such as Marxism can engage in conceptual violence, when it claims universal validity. (shrink)

Resumo: Franz Brentano não foi uma figura solitária que propôs sua filosofia isolada de outros filósofos contemporâneos na Alemanha, tal como alguns neo-brentanianos reivindicaram nos últimos anos. O objetivo deste artigo é corrigir tais concepções equivocadas estabelecendo que Brentano desenvolveu sua psicologia filosófica engajado ativamente no rico contexto histórico-intelectual e acadêmico de seu tempo - em particular, sob a influência de Hermann Lotze. Especificamente, Brentano: (i) adota de Lotze a ideia de que juízo não é apenas uma associação de ideias, (...) mas uma asserção do conteúdo; (ii) também adota a ideia de Lotze de que o conteúdo da percepção é algo dado; (iii) a noção brentaniana de intencionalidade também foi herdada de Lotze, (iv) bem como o método da psicologia descritiva; (v) finalmente, Lozte e Brentano concordaram ao admitir que percepção e conhecimento estão intrinsicamente conectados às emoções. Ao mesmo tempo, há ao menos dois pontos nos quais Brentano discorda de Lotze: (i) ele critica a teoria da percepção do signo local, bem como o atomismo de Lotze. Estas eram claramente teorias construtivistas inspiradas por Kant. (ii) Brentano também critica o princípio do teleomecanismo de Lotze, influenciado pelos idealistas alemães. (shrink)

Hermanns Lotze (1817–1881) hat nachweislich einige der bedeutendsten Philosophen des fin de siècle beeinflusst: (i) die britischen „Neo-Hegelianer“; (ii) Husserls Phänomenologie; (iii) Diltheys Philosophie des Lebens; (iv) die Neukantianer; (v) die frühere analytische Philosophie. Das angegebene Ziel seines dreibändigen Mikrokosmos (1856–1864) war „die Reflexion über den Sinn unseres menschlichen Daseins“. Die Aktualität dieser Aufgabe war eine Folge der wissenschaftlichen und industriellen Revolution Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Sie veränderte die Art, wie sich die Menschen das Universum vorstellten. Lotze sah Gefahr in (...) den zahlreichen Versuchen seitens einiger philosophisch interessierter Wissenschaftler in Deutschland, zu beweisen, dass das menschliche Sein nur mechanisch und materialistisch zu verstehen ist. Er machte es sich zur Aufgabe, den Menschen das Gefühl von Heimat in dieser stark veränderten Welt zurückzugeben. Dies erklärt auch, wieso Lotze seine Untersuchung in „völlig populärer Form“ darstellte. Lotzes Mikrokosmos war jedoch nicht nur ein Werk der populären Philosophie. Sie fußt auf fundierten theoretischen Überlegungen. Man kann Lotzes Werk als einen gewagten Versuch betrachten, die sich abzeichnende Spaltung zwischen akademischer und populärer Philosophie zu überwinden. (shrink)

The paper studies Heyting algebras within the framework of computable structure theory. We prove that the class _K_ containing all Heyting algebras with distinguished atoms and coatoms is complete in the sense of the work of Hirschfeldt et al. (Ann Pure Appl Logic 115(1-3):71-113, 2002). This shows that the class _K_ is rich from the computability-theoretic point of view: for example, every possible degree spectrum can be realized by a countable structure from _K_. In addition, there is no simple syntactic (...) characterization of computably categorical members of _K_ (i.e., structures from _K_ possessing a unique computable copy, up to computable isomorphisms). (shrink)

G.H. von Wright, G.E. Moore's and Wittgenstein's successor, and John Wisdom's predecessor as a Professor of Philosophy in Cambridge, wrote in 1993: «The history of the "analytical" movement has not yet been written in full. With its increased diversification, it becomes pertinent to try to identify its most essential features and distinguish them from later additions which are alien to its origins.» In the same year A.J. Ayer's successor as a Wykeham Professor of Logic in Oxford, M. Dummett noted: «I (...) hope that such a history will be written: it would be fascinating.» The task of this book is to fulfill these hopes. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s interpreters are undivided that the method plays a central role in his philosophy. This would be no surprise if we have in mind the Tractarian dictum: “philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity” (4.112). After 1929, Wittgenstein’s method evolved further. In its final form, articulated in Philosophical Investigations, it was formulated as different kinds of therapies of specific philosophical problems that torment our life (§§ 133, 255, 593). In this paper we follow the changes in Wittgenstein’s (...) thinking in four subsequent phases and in three dimensions: (i) in logic and ontology; (ii) in method proper; (iii) in style. (shrink)

There are prominent similarities in the writings of Leo Tolstoy and Ludwig Wittgenstein that have two main sources. On the one hand, they arise because of influences of Tolstoy on Wittgenstein; on the other hand though, they are the outcome of the fact that the two thinkers were simply closely related to one another. Since the former similarities were already discussed in the literature, in this paper I make survey mainly of the similarities between this Russian writer and Wittgenstein after (...) 1930. (shrink)

This paper investigates the role that universities play in supporting social entrepreneurs (SEs) across their ecosystem. Adopting the resource-based view (RBV) approach, we argue that universities attract, mobilize, and deploy multiple resources that benefit SEs through four main mechanisms (i.e., teaching, research, outreach, and the development of partnerships). We use a qualitative approach of 62 semi-structured interviews and 8 focus groups in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia. Our contribution shows that employing different resources and engaging in supportive activities of universities towards (...) SEs facilitate the development of university capabilities, such as an increased reputation, development of leadership skills for students and staff, and wider access to ecosystem resources that support other university activities related to teaching, research, and community outreach. The role that partnerships play in the development of these capabilities is fundamental, thanks to the different strategic alliances and mobilization of resources between universities and other actors while supporting SEs. This study contributes to our understanding of the role universities can play to intensify the nature of supportive ecosystems for SEs. This contribution is relevant not only to academics but also to practitioners, as this will shed light on the building, development, and scaling of a supportive ecosystem for SEs. (shrink)

In trying to answer the question What is analytic philosophy? I shall follow two methodological principles. (i) The first was suggested by Peter Hacker and reads: ‘Any characterisation of “analytic philosophy” which excludes Moore, Russell and the later Wittgenstein, as well as the leading figures of post War analytic philosophy [for us these are John Wisdom, Ryle, Austin, Strawson and Dummett], must surely be rejected.’ (Hacker 1996a, p. 247) The correct definition of analytic philosophy must cohere with the philosophy of (...) its generally recognized founding fathers. (ii) Any characterisation of ‘analytic philosophy’ which was massively represented in the history of philosophy in the past, must be rejected too. To be sure, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, and later also Ryle, Austin and their friends, were doing a type of philosophy which they consciously understood as new—it was intrinsically New Philosophy. The problem was only that this newness was difficult to identify and define. (shrink)

The paper follows an ontological approach in analyzing sexual experience. Sexual experience is defined as: (i) an experience in action. Correspondingly, its individuals are of two different types: (a) sense-data and (b) gestures. (ii) It is a kind of knowledge—a typical synthetic a posteriori knowledge (a virgin cannot know what sexual experience could be). (iii) It is a kind of anti-realist knowledge—its objects are constructed in the process of knowing. (iv) Sexual action proceeds in judgments that are micro-decisions of how (...) to proceed further. (v) The objects of sexual experience are seen in a specific perspective. This makes their meaning different from the meaning of physical objects. (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of manifolds was developed for the first time in a very short form in the Prolegomena to his Logical Investigations, §§ 69–70 (pp. 248–53), then repeatedly discussed in Ideas I, §§ 71–2 (pp. 148–53), in Formal and Transcendental Logic, §§ 51–4 (pp. 142–54), and finally in the Crisis, § 9 (pp. 20–60). Husserl never lost sight of it: it was his idée fixe. He discussed this theme over forty years, expressing the same, in principle, ideas on it in (...) different terms and versions. His discussions of it, however, were always cut short and inconclusive, so that he never developed his theory of manifolds in detail. Main claim in this essay is that Husserl’s theory of manifolds is twofold. It is (1) a theory of theories, advanced in the good German tradition of Wissenschaftslehre, launched first by Bernard Bolzano. The latter, in turn, is an offspring of the ancient tradition of mathesis universalis, explored in the modernity by Descartes and Leibniz. Further, (2) the theory of manifolds is also a formal theory of everything. Its objective is to provide a systematic account of how the things in the world (its parts) hang together in wholes of quite different kind. It is to be noted that Husserl explicitly speaks about (1) and only implicitly about (2). In this paper we shall also show that the theory of everything is intrinsically connected with the theory of theories. (shrink)

This is an exploration of the importance of the collocation approach in investigating language. It underpins a new conception of grammar that is: (i) intrinsically connected with lexis; (ii) investigates the language as it is naturally used in life; (iii) can be developed as a corpus-driven grammar. The collocation approach in language exploration is also examined from the perspective of some recent developments in the philosophy of language. In conclusion, I defend the identity between philosophical ontology, linguistic ontology and computational (...) ontology. (shrink)

The paper follows an ontological approach in analyzing sexual experience. Sexual experience is defined as: (i) an experience in action. Correspondingly, its individuals are of two different types: (a) sense-data and (b) gestures. (ii) It is a kind of knowledge—a typical synthetic a posteriori knowledge (a virgin cannot know what sexual experience could be). (iii) It is a kind of anti-realist knowledge—its objects are constructed in the process of knowing. (iv) Sexual action proceeds in judgments that are micro-decisions of how (...) to proceed further. (v) The objects of sexual experience are seen in a specific perspective. This makes their meaning different from the meaning of physical objects. (shrink)

Engelmann’s short book is clearly written and presents the central arguments of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus in good form. I recommend it for all those who try to understand this most intricate but also most influential philosophical work published in the last hundred years. My critical remarks only try to further clarify his interpretation.

Collection of works on literature theory, translated into Mongolian language.

The aim of the following paper is to show that it is not possible to penetrate into the depths of Nikolay Raynov's universe and to comprehend its wholeness, without posing and investigating the question about the origin or the foundation of his various creative occupations, i.e his novels, philosophic and theosophic writings, art history and critique, paintings, decorative design etc. This question is far too complex to be answered briefly without being simplified, and therefore two main directions will be (...) articulated: the recption of Orphism developed in Plotinus' and Porphyry's Neoplatonism – which is the basis of modern Theosophy –, and the synthetic understanding of art, which puts Raynov's views in close proximity to Wassily Kandinsky and Nicholas Roerich. (shrink)

RESUMO No artigo, apresenta-se um panorama da vida e da obra do professor, filólogo e cientista russo N. Vassíliev, com ênfase em sua contribuição para os estudos bakhtinianos internacionais. A longa convivência e parceria dos autores com N. Vassíliev permite-lhes não só desenhar o perfil de um pesquisador sério das humanidades, mas também mostrar seu mundo de paixões pessoais e o papel de sua biografia na escolha do núcleo de suas pesquisas científicas: a problemática dos estudos bakhtinianos. Dedica-se atenção especial (...) às soluções propostas por ele ao problema dos textos disputados. ABSTRACT The article presents an overview of the life and works of the Russian scholar, philologist Professor Nikolay Vasiliev and the assessment of his contribution to international Bakhtin studies. For many years the authors have communicated and cooperated with N. Vasiliev during the long years that give them the opportunity not only to create a portrait of this serious researcher, but also to show the world his hobbies, how his biography influenced on the choice of the issue of Bakhtin studies as a central topic for his research. Special attention is paid to his proposed solutions to the problem of disputed texts. (shrink)

Suvremene bioetičke rasprave reaktualizirale su pitanje smjene epoha. Bioetika je nastala upravo kao moralna i civilizacijska reakcija u novostvorenoj povijesnoj situaciji. U tom kontekstu, potrebno je analizirati, s jedne strane, promišljanje prijeloma epoha i predviđanje »novog srednjovjekovlja« u djelu ruskog filozofa N. A. Berdjajeva te, s druge strane, pojavu bioetike. Hoćemo li zaista zakoračiti u novu epohu, kakva će ona biti te što ćemo i u kojem obliku prenijeti iz sadašnje epohe – najviše ovisi o tome kakvog će duha biti (...) čovjek. Stanje čovjekova duha možemo iščitati iz čovjekova odnosa prema tehnici, odnosno s obzirom na snažnu interaktivnu ulogu tehnike u našem životu. Kako je pitanje odnosa čovjeka i stroja jedno od ključnih bioetičkih pitanja, problem tehnike nužno je analizirati iz perspektive Berdjajevljeva odnosa čovjeka i stroja, ali i u sklopu Heideggerova promišljanja biti tehnike. Jednako kao i Berdjajev, Heidegger smatra da ne treba poricati tehniku, već tražiti izmjenu uloge tehnike i podlaganje čovjekovu duhu na kojem leži zadatak dokučiti ono spasonosno. Duh današnjeg čovjeka duh je bogolikog čovjeka koji, uz pomoć uznapredovalog stroja, izaziva prirodu , ali taj isti stroj, koji njemu služi kao sredstvo, toliko je uznapredovao da je sada u mogućnosti izazivati njega. U tom je kontekstu nužno okrenuti se bioetici. Upravo je bioetika sa svojom pluriperspektivnom metodologijom zaslužna za pokušaj okupljanja različitih sustava vrijednosti kako bi se zajedno usmjerio sadašnji sustav vrijednosti i zaštitio budući, ali i budućnost uopće. No, hoće li bioetika ostati samo na razini rijetkog pozitivnog primjera u nizu negativnih znakova dolaska nove epohe ili ćemo ozbiljno shvatiti princip odgovornosti što nas dovodi na prag bioetičke epohe te hoće li promjena duha sadašnjeg čovjeka, prema kojem nas vodi bioetičko promišljanje, doista dovesti do podvrgavanja tehnike čovjekovom duhu – ostaju otvorena pitanja.The problem of the turn of epochs is debated once more nowadays. Contemporary discussions on bioethics once again pose this very question. Bioethics as such was created as a moral and civilisational response to the new historical situation. In that context one needs to analyze, on the one hand, both the problem of the turn of epochs and the prediction of the new Middle Ages proposed by Russian philosopher N. A. Berdyayev and, on the other hand, the emergence of bioethics which raised the question of the turn of epochs for the second time. Will we really reach the new epoch, what will it look like, what and in which form shall we transmit from the present epoch? These questions ultimately depend on the state of the human spirit which can be deciphered from man’s relation to technology, taking into account the strong interactive role which technology plays in our daily lives. Bearing in mind that the relation between the man and the machine is one of the crucial bioethical issues, this question of technology should be analyzed from Berdyayev’s relation between the man and the machine, but also within Heidegger’s analysis of the essence of technology. Similarly to Berdyayev, Heidegger states that technology must not be contradicted or denied, but rather, changed in a way to serve the human spirit – which is entrusted with the task of understanding the saving elements. The spirit of the modern man is the spirit of the divine-like creature . It is the spirit of a man who, with the help of a developed machine can challenge nature , but this same machine, which serves him as a means, has evolved to the point that it can challenge the man. In this context it seems essential to turn to bioethics. It is precisely bioethics which, thanks to its pluri-perspective methodology, takes credit for covering different systems of values to direct the present system in the right way and protect the future system and the future in general. However, the questions remain whether bioethics will stay the only positive example among the multitude of negative signs and predictions, whether it will lead us to a new, yet unknown, epoch and whether we will take seriously the principle of responsibility which leads us to the threshold of the bioethical epoch and whether the change in the spirit of the present-day man, triggered by the bioethical thinking, can change technology to make it subordinate to the human spirit. (shrink)

The book under review is a translation of a monograph written in Czech entitled Nikolaj Losskij: Obhájce mystické intuice, published in 2011. As a theologian, the author is above all interested in the spiritual and theological aspects of Lossky’s thought. The first two chapters are concerned with Lossky’s life and work before and during his years in Czechoslovakia. The third chapter is devoted to the analysis and interpretation of Lossky’s booklet Mystical Intuition published in English in 1938, wherein Lossky presents (...) his theory of mystical intuition, as opposed to his theories of sensory and intellectual intuition. The last chapter is about Lossky’s conception of the self and of society, his interpretation of Dostoevsky, his theory of reincarnation, and his relationship with Ctibor Bezděk, who applied Lossky’s philosophy to medical practice. Since the book was written by a Czech author who has insider-knowledge of the literature written in Czecho-Slovak, most interesting for the reader unacquainted with this family of languages is the discussion of Lossky’s relationships—personal and intellectual—with Czech and Slovak philosophers such as Tomáš Masaryk, Ferdinand Pelikán, Vladimír Hoppe, Ctibor Bezděk, and Igor Hrušovský, as well as the discussion of Lossky’s publications in Czech. Given that the latter aspects are what is truly unique to this book and novel in the Anglophone literature on Lossky, this is what I focus on in this review. (shrink)

This volume offers a very welcome in-depth look at a particular group of the philosophers associated with the Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy . The editors stress that these two groupings differ and call only the former the “Berlin Group for scientific philosophy” : Hans Reichenbach, Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling, Paul Oppenheim and Carl Gustav Hempel. Parts I and II provide introductions and historical context for the group as a whole and Parts III–VI consider highly specific aspects of the work (...) of its members but for two overview papers on Grelling and Hempel . To appreciate the volume best, it may be helpful to distinguish between the straightforward historical investigations and the more revisionist historiographical contributions, the latter much smaller in number but prominently placed by one of the editors. While the former will be applauded unreser .. (shrink)

The article explores the parallels between the theory of sympathy developed by Max Scheler and the understanding of the foreign I in Russian philosophy. Russian philosophy has been developing the topic of foreign psychic life since the 1880s, and it regards Scheler’s theory as unable to raise above the level of emotional contagion. True sympathy is possible, when the Other is already present to the I, or, according to Nikolay Lossky, there is an original gnoseological difference between “the lived” (...) and “the observed”. Russian philosophy emphasizes the hermeneutical aspect of the problem – the original division and the search for understanding, as does Vasily Rozanov, who also shifted the accent from the general to the individual, particular and even intimate. Semyon Frank pointed out that the feelings of another person will only form a shell of meaningless observation, if not connected to the living knowledge through the human ability to resonate with something transcendent. And Russian philosophy assumes the fact of the original collectiveness of consciousness. This is the impulse given to it by the philosophy of Sergei Trubetskoy and developed in the philosophy of Russian neo-Kantianism, with Ivan Lapshin depicting a creative person, taking up the collective function of experimenting over the psyche to create and expand the map of human feelings. (shrink)

The Russian intuitivist philosopher Nikolay Lossky repeatedly admitted Kant’s substantial formative influence on him as a scholar. Moreover, Lossky was a disciple of the Russian Kantian Aleksander Vvedensky, and was one of the most successful translators of the first Critique. However, his own philosophical project is rather the opposite of the critical programme. While in the framework of Lossky’s epistemology the specificities of his reading of Kant have received a fair amount of attention in Russian scholarship, in the ethical (...) field the Russian philosopher’s comments on Kant have passed largely unnoticed. My task is to reveal the link between Kant’s practical philosophy and Lossky’s ethics. A demonstration of the degree of Kant’s influence in this field will enlarge and concretise the current thinking about Lossky’s perception of Kant. We are looking at a whole range of parallels and borrowings. My comparative analysis focuses on the following aspects: 1) definition and uses of the term “categorical imperative”, 2) free will as the condition of the possibility of moral action, 3) the cause of moral evil, 4) the role of the idea of God in ethics. As a result, I reveal how Lossky used elements of Kant’s practical philosophy as conceptual, terminological and rhetorical resources in his theonomic ethics, and how the Russian philosopher interpreted them in line with his own doctrine. I argue that Lossky’s use of the Kantian moral terminology is incautious and debatable and point out several intersections of ethical argumentations in the light of its projection on radically different ontological and epistemological principles. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century in the Russian-speaking philosophical space philosophical projects emerged which brought ontology and gnoseology closer together. One can observe this process, for example, in the philosophical doctrines of the Russian intuitivists Nikolay Lossky and Semyon Frank. I demonstrate that the emergence of these doctrines and the development of their onto-gnoseological categorial apparatus were mainly connected with the criticism of the Neo-Kantian theory of cognition and the possibility of transcendent knowledge as such. The main (...) sources of my study are The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge and The World as an Organic Whole by N. O. Lossky and The Object of Knowledge and The Unknowable by S. L. Frank. My investigation makes it possible to treat Lossky’s categorial framework as the representation of a system of levels of the universe each of which is characterised by two aspects: the ontological, i.e. it is part of the unity of the world, and the gnoseological, i.e. it has an independent cognitive significance. Frank considers categories to be an organic part of the ontological proof of intuitivism. A common trend in the construction of categorial schemes by Lossky and Frank is their striving to combine gnoseological and ontological descriptions of categories. The key difference is the way an onto-gnoseological system as a whole is justified. In revealing the contradictions in Lossky’s conception, I proceed from the critical remarks of S. A. Askoldov, pointing out that these contradictions stem from an absolutisation of intuition in cognition, the renunciation of the idea of gnoseological transcendence, incompleteness of the theory of immanence and discordance between onto-gnoseological categories. Askoldov’s critical comments clarify the substantive features of Lossky’s theory and the essence of the transformations carried out in Frank’s absolute ideal-realism. (shrink)

My general objective in this paper is to provide the outlines of the reception of Baruch Spinoza and Moses Mendelssohn in the Russian Enlightenment of the late 18th century as well as in the Russian-Jewish Haskalah. In part of the paper I consider Gavrila Derzhavin’s mention of Mendelssohn in his “Opinion,” the translation of Mendelssohn’s Phaedon in Nikolay Novikov’s Masonic-inspired journal Utrennyi Svet, and the readings of Spinoza’s view on God and then-shared interpretation of his views as an “atheism” (...) in Feofan Propovich, Vasily Trediakovskiy, and Alexander Sumarokov. In the part on the late Russian-Jewish Haskalah of 1860s I examine two intellectual biographies appeared in the period—Saveliy Kovner on Spinoza and Yakov Gurliand on Mendelssohn, which aim to interpret positions of Spinoza and Mendelssohn as exemplary strategies of the Jewish emancipation within the framework of claims and prospects of the modern European culture. I also rediscover and reinterpret Spinoza’s approach to religion as the late Russian Haskalah’s authors strongly object to label Spinoza’s philosophy of religion as “atheistic” and consider it as close to the “pure, or true Judaism.”. (shrink)

Книга предназначена для социологов, политологов, философов, а также преподавателей и студентов социальных и политических специальностей.